Category Archives: History

Wartime Deaths Due to Soviet Repression

Bellow is the reproduction of a text first published on my blog Crappy Town. It tries to establish the number of Soviet citizens that died as a result of repression by the Soviet state between July 1941 and May 1945 when the USSR was at war with Germany during the Second World War. It is part of my emerging working paper that tries to break down the 25 million losses of the Soviet Union in the Soviet-German War between its different causes.

Wartime Deaths Due to Soviet Repression

The Soviet Union under Stalin was a highly repressive state that engaged in repression of its citizens on a vast scale. Its repression was deadly and resulted in numerous deaths, even when the state had not explicitly set out to make repression lethal and to cause the death of those repressed. What is more, the four years of the Great Patriotic War were characterized by a sharp increase in the scale repression and the occurrence of deaths due to repression relative to most peacetime years under Stalin, including the immediate pre-war time.

The Gulag

Archival data shows the gulag administration in the years 1941 through 1945 presided over the deaths of 1.02 million inmates of whom 622 thousand prisoners in labor camps of the gulag, 312 thousand in labor colonies of the gulag and 85 thousand in prisons. The total number of deaths the gulag was responsible for in this time frame may be even higher on the account of deaths among former inmates who died after their release but as a consequence of the conditions they had been subjected to during their imprisonment.[19]

During the war mortality among the inmates of the gulag increased sharply so that one half of those who perished in the gulag did so in the war years, particularly between 1941 and 1943 and mainly of malnutrition related causes. German invasion of the USSR caused food shortages everywhere in the Soviet Union, however, malnutrition and the consequent mortality in the gulag was much more severe than among free Soviet citizens in the unoccupied USSR.

The most proximate cause of the crisis for the inmates of the gulag was that they were being kept imprisoned, mostly unjustly, with little aces to food, not that the Germans had invaded the Soviet Union and caused a general shortage of food. Had the regime released the inmates it was unable to feed they would have stood a far better chance of surviving than they did in the camps. This would have only benefited the war effort as a gulag inmate was only half as productive as a free laborer.

Internal Exile and the Labor Army

Another major category of Soviet citizens who suffered lethal repression at the hands of the Soviet regime during the war were deportees in internal exile. Deportees were usually stripped of their civic freedoms, lost most of their property and were often dumped in some of the most inhospitable parts of the Soviet Union, condemned to live in “special settlements” they would often first yet have to build. Besides working in the exile colonies themselves they were lent out to industries as unfree labor, or, during the war, could find themselves conscripted into the Labor Army. The exile groups experienced a far higher rate of mortality compared to the rest of the Soviet population, particularly in the first several years of their exile, after which their circumstances usually gradually improved.

Under Stalin the Soviet Union internally exiled just over 6 million people of whom 2 million during the war itself, 383 thousand immediately preceding the war in 1940-41, as well as 700 thousand in the second half of the 1930s. Russian demographer D.M. Ediev estimates that until 1952 between 700 thousand and 1 million people had died as a consequence of deportations, however, the question here is how many of these perished during the four years of the war itself.[20]

Ediev calculates the total excess mortality among the 1383 thousand exiled Soviet Germans and Finns who were mainly deported 1941 was 248 thousand. Similarly the excess mortality among the 1025 thousand deported Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushetians, Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Meshketian Turks who were deported in 1943 and 1944 was 226 thousand. Nearly three quarters of the 380 thousand who were exiled in 1940 and first half of 1941 were former Polish citizens, who were therefore subject to an amnesty of August 17th 1941 and June 30th 1943.[21] Since their banishment was much shorter their losses would have been considerably smaller than those of the the Soviet Germans and Finns who were deported in the second half of 1941. Combined, until 1952 the exile groups deported from 1940 to 1944 may have experienced about 500 thousand excess deaths.

Given that deportees were most likely to die in the first few years of their exile it is probable just under half of these 500,000 deaths occurred during the war itself. Along with the excess losses of the more “settled” exiles deported in the 1930s the total figure of wartime deaths among exile groups in special settlements and the Labor Army may be around 300 thousand.


It is well documented that 1941 through 1945 civilian courts in the USSR sentenced to death 22,572 people for criminal offenses and 42,149 people for political offenses.[22] Additionally, as has been discussed in section 2, during the war some 135 thousand Red Army soldiers may have been executed after a court martial.

Furthermore during the initial stage of the war the NKVD carried out prison massacres against inmates of Soviet prisons in the western USSR. Due to the speed of the initial German advance across USSR territory and the existing demands on the Soviet transportation system the Soviet authorities found it impossible to evacuate the prisons lying in the path of the Germans in time. Rather than leave them to the enemy the center ordered local NKVD guards to evacuate only some categories of prisoners, release others and execute still others.

Consequentially the NKVD massacred about 8,789 inmates in prisons in Ukraine and 530 in Belarus, an additional 940 prisoners during the evacuations from these prisons, and an unknown number in the prisons in Baltic republics.[23] The number executed in such circumstances is therefore not fully certain, however, the losses among the prisoner population that were sustained in this way are counted in the 85 thousand wartime losses among the prison population anyway.

Altogether, in the course of the war about 210 thousand Soviet citizens were outright executed or massacred by the Soviet security apparatus.


Altogether during the Soviet-German war of 1941-45 there were around 1.5 million deaths of Soviet citizens due to repression of the Soviet authorities. 1 million deaths among the captive population in the gulag and the prisons, 200 thousand condemned to death and executed of whom 65 thousand civilians and 135 thousand military, as well as roughly 300 thousand internal exiles who perished during the war as a consequence of deportations and conscription into the labor army.

Table of Contents

19. Michael Haynes and Rumy Hasan, A Century of State Murder? Death and Policy in Twentieth-Century Russia (London: Pluto Press, 2003) 214-215.

20. For the size, time and composition of individual deportation operations see Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004) 327-333. For the figures on mortality see Dalkhat Ediev, Demograficheskie Poteri Deportirovannyh Narodov SSSR (Stavropol’: StGAU “AGRUS”, 2003) 302-303.

21. Polian, 2004, 119.

22. Stephen Wheatcroft “Victims of Stalinism and the Soviet Secret Police: The Comparability and Reliability of the Archival Data — Not the Last Word”. Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 51, No. 2 (1999): 337-338.

23. Aleksandr Gur’yanov and Aleksandr Kokurin “Èvakuacija tjurem. 1941”. Rossijskij istoricheskij zhurnal “Karta” No.6 (1994): 16-27.

~ Marko

Away with Suvorov

Having gone through Bionic Mosquito’s The Chief Culprit post forum-style, and offered comment to individual statements I would also like to offer commentary on his post and his musings as a whole.

In his article Mosquito spends almost the entire text talking about hardware. The reader is supposed to be convinced of the immense power of the USSR’s Red Army on the account it could field twenty thousand tanks and fifteen thousand aircraft — more than the entire rest of the world combined. But to the contrary what Mosquito seems to believe this is no indication the Soviet Union considered itself remotely ready for war. As anyone who has ever operated heavy machinery may attest to, an experienced operator will be many more times more efficient than his counterpart without experience. The USSR may have had thousands of aircraft and tanks, but did it have operators to match?

In July 1941 the Soviet Union was in a possession of an armed force that was lush with advanced weaponry, but that was still suffering from extremely severe deficiencies when it came to organization, leadership and training. To address these it was involved in hurried training programs and was actually still in the midst of an extremely ambitious program of reorganization and reform that would not be complete until mid 1942.

Through most of the 1930s — that is up until the disturbance of the purges — the Soviet Union held a technological lead in combat aircraft and tanks over all the other great powers. On the eve of the war its air and tank fleets were no longer state of the art as they were mostly made up of designs from the mid 1930s (such as the I-16 fighter and the T-26 tank). Nonetheless in well-trained hands these would have been perfectly respectable weapons. The quality and quantity of its weaponry was never a Soviet weak point but on the contrary something the Soviet system excelled at providing.

The Achilles heel of the Soviet armed forces was its unsettledness. The Soviet Union went about its build up of the Red Army in the same radical manner it went about everything else —  at a breakneck speed and expecting the maximum results in the shortest amount of time. As a result it took only a short while for its army to look impressive on paper, but underneath it suffered from critical imbalances and shortcomings.
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A Hand to Mosquito


A libertarian blogger Bionic Mosquito is doing a review of The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II from the pen of Viktor Suvorov, a clownish Cold War era Soviet defector who cut out a living for himself telling his Western hosts whatever he thought they would enjoy hearing about his country of birth. Since the topic covered by the book is one I know a little bit about I figure it would be appropriate to help out a libertarian blogger with his reading and offer a few corrections and explanations.

A.) Bionic Mosquito writes:

“The narrative – peddled both by the Soviets during and after the Second World War, as well as by many in the west – is that the Red Army was totally unprepared for war.  Hitler overwhelmed a clearly inferior Soviet army with his surprise attack on June 22, 1941.”

Actually that is not the prevailing narrative. Immediately after the war Stalin explained the cause of early Soviet defeats in such terms. According to the Soviet dictator the Soviet Union, as well as the United States and Britain were peace loving countries and as such failed to prepare for the war to the extend Germany and Japan did. As a consequence they suffered a series of early defeats in 1940 and 1941 in France, Hong Kong, Singapore, Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and the western USSR. Such an explanation served to relativise the disaster the Soviets suffered in 1941 by placing it in the context of other rather less catastrophic and dreadful setbacks suffered by the other allied nations, and in this way deflect the blame for the horrible losses and destruction the Soviet people had sustained in the war, much of it needlessly.

It was an explanation that was seemingly accepted by Murray Rothbard who in For a New Liberty spoke of an “unwarlike Stalin” who had “allowed the Russian army to fall into disrepair”. This was not accepted for long even in the Soviet Union. Instead the common wisdom after Khruschev’s rise to power presupposed an innovative and powerful pre-war Red Army on the ascent, which was prevented from effectively defending the country by the person of Stalin who first gutted it in the Great Officer Purge and then tied its hands in 1941 and left it exposed to a German surprise attack when he in the face of all facts refused to believe the German invasion was imminent. This view was also accepted by many in the West who had a somewhat favorable view of the Soviet Union or its people. Those with an unfavorable view on the other hand mostly explained the cause of German success and Soviet setbacks in 1941 in terms of Soviet or Russian inferiority vis-a-vis the Germans.

Whether they played up the Soviet lack of sophistication that supposedly made the Red Army unable to make its greater numbers count against the Germans, or else the fateful interference of Stalin in a few key matters, no one actually subscribed to the idea the Red Army on the eve of war was inherently puny or in disrepair. They scarcely could have for the level of Soviet investment in their armed forces before the war was staggering and as such impossible to ignore, discount or shrug off. Indeed the Soviet defense budget rose steadily throughout the 1930s. Where it accounted for 3.4% of the national budget in 1933 and 9.1% the next year, it climbed to 16.1% in 1936, and on to fully 25.6% of the total in 1939.[1]
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From Volunteers to Conscripts: the French Republican Army 1789-1794-Part Two

For Part One go here

Following widespread popular indignation in the aftermath the Mutiny at Nancy in 1790 [1], the National Assembly decided to completely overhaul the much despised military disciplinary code. This was a drawn-out reform which took over a year to be carried and was further amended between 1792 and 1793, in the wake of the overthrow of the monarchy. The Terror brought further changes in 1794.

These reforms had two aims. First, they broke the absolute power of the officer corps. Second, they attempted to give the soldiers a fairer trial in case of court martial.
For minor breaches of discipline (fautes contre la discipline) like drunkenness and disobedience, corporal punishment was strictly forbidden and to be replaced by extra work and confinement. Officers who attempted the old beating by the flat of the sword were to be stripped of their rank, cashiered with dishonor and sent to jail for three years.

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From Volunteers to Conscripts: the French Republican Army 1789-1794-Part One

In this short essay I will attempt to chronicle the transformation of the French Republican Army from a volunteer army made up of professional soldiers and willing citizen-soldiers in a large mass of military serfs in the 1789-1794 period.

I know this topic will be highly controversial but I personally believe it provides a useful discussion and reflection topic in the defense debate. Any criticism, as long as it’s constructive, is highly welcome.

The armies of the Ancien Regime were, essentially, volunteer in nature. France had traditionally three sources of recruits.
The first, and most important, were the great cities like Paris, Lyon and Toulouse. Recruiters particularly targeted paupers, easily attracted by a steady, if meager, paycheck and the promise of food and lodge, and the younger sons of artisans and shopkeepers, who could not hope to take over the family business and were usually doomed to a lifetime of perpetual misery.
The second were the country estates of certain noble military families. Members of these families, serving as military officers, were regularly given six-month leaves (semestres) to recruit troops for the army. Military life, as hard as it was, was usually seen as an attractive alternative for the younger sons of peasant families. Moreover these men usually ended up serving under the same noblemen who had recruited them, often in highly regarded cavalry and artillery unit.
The third were the many foreign (Swiss, Bavarian, Irish etc) regiments serving France. These were of very varied quality and each had its own way of finding recruits. [1]

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Desocialization Revisited


The Main Idea: Looking back on the Albanian desocialization drive of the early ’90s, the failure to securitize state-owned assets and the insistence on a disastrous policy of physical land restitution stand out as the main failings.

1. Introduction

1.1 Something more than twenty years ago, the Socialist Regimes of Eastern Europe fell one by one after the unwillingness of the Soviets to resist such development by force became known. Despite having severed all meaningful political connections to its European fellows since the ’50 and its lone Chinese ally since the ’70, the Albanian regime still could not avoid joining the fate of the overt Socialism in Europe, and by 1992 a feverish desocialization effort guided by a new government was in the works.

1.2 Looking back on that effort, what can one say about the long-term effects of the route chosen to transform a state-run economy into a mostly private one? To what extent where the Austrian prescriptions on desocialization followed, and to what effect? I will try to answer these questions, without expecting my analysis to apply to every eastern desocialization effort.

Long time no see

Long time no see

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An Arms Race as Long as Life: DPR Korea in Context

DPRK troops
The history of the 20th century usually comes packaged in two parts. The post-war period after the end of the Second World War, and the earlier pre-war period. While the two are easily distinct there are also common threads that run through both of them and conceivably connect them into one whole. One such thread is an arms race dynamic. Most of the 20th century, beginning in the 1930s at the latest, along with our own time in the 21st, conceivably tells a story of a single uninterrupted arms race.

Clearly, the timeframe of the Great War from 1914 to 1918 was a period of militarism and unprecedented global buildup of arms. It saw the rise of economic regimentation and the subordination of economic activity to the immediate needs of the state, as well as of the view that saw the usefulness of production primarily in giving a nation the ability to wage an extended industrial war.

Following the end of the Great War military expenditure fell sharply and receded to levels that did not seem a cause for alarm. However, the experience of the war could not simply be erased. Even as the size of armies was reduced old thinking remained and influential circles continued to think of the economy as another branch of the armed forces. According to this thinking the usefulness of bountiful agricultural and industrial production lay primarily in the fact it granted a nation the ability to raise, feed, equip and maintain a military that was as large and as mechanized as humanly possible. This, the experience of the First World War had shown, was the first prerequisite to avoid national disaster and national humiliation, as had befell Germany, Russia, Turkey and Austria-Hungary.

In this way even after the Great War had ended its shadow continued to loom, as its lessons continued to inform participants and non-participants alike. Japan for example had seen that a major cause of German defeat in the war had been its inability to feed its population from its own agricultural production. For all its industrial might Germany had in fact not been capable of an extended industrial war. Once the British established their maritime blockade and cut off Germany from its imports the populace of the latter had been placed on the path leading to slow starvation.

The Japanese knew that being even less self-sufficient than the Germans, they were even more vulnerable to blockade than had been Germany itself. Being therefore categorically incapable of an extended war in a serious conflagration Japan was no true independent power capable of autonomous action on the world stage. To truly become such it would need to field a large, sophisticated army and navy, but also be able to produce, or extract sufficient quantities of everything it needed, whether it was foodstuffs, ore, oil or machinery, in the confines of its own borders. The quest for military power, was therefore inseparable from the quest for autarky.
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